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DOES THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR R&D
DEPEND ON THE DEGREE OF APPROPRIABILITY?
LilianaGelabertw
Andrea Fosfuriz
JosepA.Tribo¤ §
We explore the interaction between public support for R&D and
appropriability using a dataset constructed from the Spanish Commu-
nity Innovation Survey, for the period 2000–2005. We find that public
support policy is less able to stimulate privately financed internal R&D
in firms where appropriability mechanisms are more effective. On
average, the effect of public support for R&D is three times larger for
those firms reporting a level of appropriability below the median vis-
a`-vis those firms for which appropriability is above the median level.
Furthermore, for supported firms with the highest degree of appro-
priability, crowding out cannot be ruled out.
I. INTRODUCTION
INNOVATION POLICY IS ONE OF THE MAJOR CHALLENGES for policy makers in
developed countries. Public intervention in R&D activities is justified by the
imperfect appropriability that applies to knowledge production (Arrow
[1962], Nelson [1959]). The implication of this market failure is that firms
underinvest in R&D activities since they cannot fully appropriate the social
returns stemming from their innovations. In this context, governments have
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threepotentialmechanisms toalleviate suchmarket failure: first,byundertaking
public R&D activities through research institutes or national laboratories or
contracting out R&D activities to private firms in those areas where
appropriability problems are acute; second, by strengthening the protection
for intellectual property rights (IPR), thereby increasing the share of social
returns that the innovator can ultimately appropriate; finally, by implementing
incentive mechanisms like tax benefits, subsidies or public loans at low/null
interest rates, which, in turn, would reduce R&D costs for private firms.1
In this paper we deal with the latter mechanism, namely, public support
for R&D. The dominant theme of the literature on public support policies is
related to their net effect on firm R&D investment, that is, assessing
empirically the extent to which public support induces or substitutes
privately financed R&D expenses (see Hall and Van Reenen [2000], Klette
et al. [2000], David et al. [2000] for surveys of the existing literature). We
offer a new twist to this literature by focusing on the contingencies that
moderate the effect of R&D support policies, rather than by just measuring
their impact on privately financed R&D spending. Put differently, our
objective here is to explain the heterogeneity across firms in the effect of
R&Dsupport policies. Specifically, we focus on the role played by the degree
of appropriability, i.e., the ability to appropriate the rents associatedwith an
innovation. Although the concept of appropriability is central to the
theoretical argument that justifies public intervention in R&D activities
(Arrow [1962]), to the best of our knowledge, there is no attempt in the
literature to incorporate appropriability issues when assessing the effect of
R&D support policies empirically.
Drawing on data from the Spanish Community Innovation Survey (CIS),
for the period 2000–2005, we find that the elasticity of privately financed
R&D expenditures with respect to public support decreases with the degree
of appropriability. That is, firms that have reported that mechanisms to
protect innovation are more effective respond with a smaller increase in
privately financed R&Dwhen they receive public support. Moreover, when
protectionmechanisms are identified as being extremely effective, we cannot
rule out the existence of crowding out, i.e., the amount of investment in
R&D, net of the government support, shrinks. This finding is robust to
several controls for the endogeneity of public support, and for unobserved
heterogeneity across firms. It is also robust to the inclusion of other
determinants of the effectiveness of public support discussed in the literature
such as, for instance, firm size and financial constraints (Hyytinen and
Toivanen [2005], Gonza´lez and Pazo´ [2008]), and across different empirical
models (2SLS, Tobit, matching approach). Although, theoretically, there
are several explanations as to why this could happen, an intuitive
1Both IPR protection and public support policies are formulated to have a direct effect on
private incentives to innovate by enhancing profitability and reducingR&Dcosts, respectively.
APPROPRIABILITY AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR R&D 737
r 2009 The Authors. Journal compilationr 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
Economics.
2
interpretation is that firms with stronger appropriability are more likely to
ask for public support purely as a way of reducing the cost of projects that
were profitable in the first place without such support; whereas those firms
that face appropriability problems are more likely to ask for public support
in order to make an R&D project profitable.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section II summarizes the
existing literature on public support for R&D activities, motivates our study
and explains its contribution. Section III describes the data and variables used
in the empirical analysis. In section IV we discuss the endogeneity bias
affecting public support, present our instrument, and report the results of the
baseline empirical model, namely, a two-stage least squares estimation with
firm fixed effects. Section V presents several robustness checks that further
corroborate our main finding. The paper concludes with some final remarks.
II. RELATED LITERATURE AND CONTRIBUTION
The extensive literature reviewed by Jaffe [1996] documents the presence of
spillovers in R&Dactivities. A crucial consequence of these spillovers is that
the value generated by innovationmay be captured by: competitors, owners
of complementary assets, consumers, etc. (Teece, [1986]). Hence, as a result,
firmswould tend to invest below the socially optimal level ofR&D(Griliches
[1992]). Does public support for R&D activities solve this market failure?
A necessary condition for an affirmative answer is that privately financed
R&D expenditures increase after a firm receives public support. This occurs
because public support can reduce both the fixed and the marginal cost of
R&Dactivity. Lach [2002] suggests that the likelihood of stimulating further
private R&D expenditures is higher when the subsidized project involves
setting-up or upgrading research facilities that have the potential to lower
the fixed costs of other current, or future, non-subsidized R&D projects. In
addition to the direct effect, public support for R&D might also have an
indirect effect that lowers further the marginal cost of R&D activities.
Lerner [1999] and Hall [2002], among others, argue that public support
could represent a positive endorsement of the quality of a firm’s R&D
activity in the eyes of potential investors which, in turn, reduces their
required return when providing additional funds. For instance, Lerner
[1999] mentions, as an example, that specialists at the National Institutes of
Health or at the Department of Defense may have considerable insight
about which biotechnology or advanced materials companies are the most
promising.2
2 To test for the existence of this effect, Lerner examines the performance of high-technology
firms that receive funds fromamajor public venture initiative, and compares it with a sample of
matching firms. He finds that while awardees and matching firms did not differ significantly in
the likelihood of receiving private venture capital in the years prior to the award, in subsequent
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Although the ultimate aim of public support is to stimulate further
company fundedR&D expenditures, one cannot discard the possibility that
public grants substitute for privatemoney, the so-called crowding out effect.
This could be the casewhenpublic agencies fundprojectswith higher success
probabilities to avoid appearing to squander public money (Lach, [2002],
Wallsten [2000]). In this situation, the firm does not decide to invest
additional money in the subsidized project as a consequence of receiving the
grant.3 Moreover, David et al. [2000] argue that, even if the grant attracts
additional private money into the subsidized project, the overall effect on
privately financed R&D expenditures can still be negative because the
private money flowing to the subsidized project may come from other non-
subsidized ones. In particular, they claim that an inelastic supply of R&D
inputs which drives prices up, together with liquidity constraints, reduce the
cost effectiveness of investing in non-subsidized projects. As a result, a firm
may decide to discontinue an active R&D project in order to allocate those
resources to the subsidized one. In this situation, the amount of privately
financed R&D expenditures may increase, or decrease, depending on the
relative importance of each project.
The existing evidence about the effectiveness of R&D public support
policies is rather mixed. David et al. [2000] systematically survey the
econometric work over the last 35 years and suggest that conflicting results
arise from: different levels of aggregation; the multiplicity of econometric
techniques; the existence of different national support programs and a lack
of a formal framework. Most importantly, most of the older studies do not
properly take into account the potential endogeneity of public support, i.e.,
public support is not randomly allocated across firms.
More recent studies on the evaluation of R&D policies, all of which
control for endogeneity, still provide conflicting results. For instance,
Wallsten [2000] finds that grants provided by the Small Business and
Innovation Program (a U.S. program directed at providing grants to small
firms), crowd out privately financed R&D, dollar for dollar. On the
contrary, Lach [2002] shows that subsidies induce 11 additional monetary
units of in-house R&D for each unit of subsidy received by small Israeli
firms, while the effect is negative, albeit insignificantly, for large Israeli firms.
Czarnitzki and Licht [2006] find a large degree of additionality in public
R&D grants in relation to privately financed R&D expenses in Germany,
with a more pronounced effect in Eastern Germany during the transition
years, the awardees were significantly more likely to receive such financing. This finding is
consistent with the receipt of awards playing an important role in certifying firm quality.
3However, even when crowding out occurs on the subsidized project, the overall effect on a
firm’s privately financed R&D expenditures depends on the final assignation of the funds
released by the subsidy. If the firm is liquidity constrained, it could decide to undertake another
project that could not have otherwise been financed; thus, counterbalancing the substitution
effect on the subsidized project.
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period. Busom [2000] analyses the effect of Spanish government subsidies on
R&D using a sample of 147 firms, and finds that for 30% of the firms, full
crowding out cannot be ruled out. More recently, Gonza´lez et al. [2005]
address the same issue using a panel of about 2,000 firms. The econometric
analysis controls for the censoring of theR&Dvariable and for the potential
endogeneity of public grants. They find that public subsidies play a positive,
although modest, role. The estimated percentage increase in privately
financed R&D expenditures is higher for the smallest firms. These firms are
also more likely to start R&D activities after receiving a subsidy. However,
the analysis also suggests that subsidies go mainly to firms that would have
performed innovative activities irrespective of such subsidies.
Such conflicting findings may suggest that the effect of public support for
stimulating R&D activities is contingent on firm characteristics and, thus,
heterogeneous across recipient firms. A few studies have focused on the
moderating role of firm size. Specifically, Lach [2002], Gonza´lez et al. [2005]
and Gonza´lez and Pazo´ [2008] provide evidence consistent with the notion
that smaller firms are more likely to increase their privately financed R&D
expenditures as a consequence of public support. A conjectured explanation
for this finding is that smaller firms tend to suffer from financial constraints,
which the public supportmight help to alleviate. In line with this conjecture,
Hyytinen and Toivanen [2005], using survey data for Finland, show that
government funding disproportionately helps firms from industries that are
dependent on external financing.
We follow this line of research and, specifically, investigate the interaction
between public support and appropriability on a firm’s privately financed
R&D expenditures. To the best of our knowledge this relationship has not
yet been addressed in the existing literature on R&D policies; neither from a
theoretical nor empirical point of view. This is even more surprising if one
takes into account the fact that governments can influence the degree of
appropriability by, for instance, enforcing stricter IPR protection. Hence,
appropriability and public support for R&D are two alternative channels to
affect directly a firm’s incentive to innovate. Showing that one policy ismore
or less effective when the other is also implemented actively is both
interesting from an empirical standpoint and relevant in practice. Thus, our
paper not only contributes to the existing literature by proposing a different
lens through which the heterogeneity in the effect of R&D subsidies can be
analyzed, but it also sheds light on how different policy instruments that
stimulate R&D activities interact with each other.
III. DATA AND VARIABLES
III (i). Sample
The empirical analysis relies on data from the Community Innovation
Survey (CIS) carried out in Spain between 2000 and 2005 by the National
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Institute of Statistics (INE).4 The sampling design of the CIS survey is as
follows. All firms that have received any form of public support for R&D or
those that have reported R&D expenses, in the last 20 years, are surveyed
every year. The rest of the surveyed firms come from a random sample
stratified by size and sector among non-R&D performing firms. Given that
Spanish firms have a legal obligation to respond to questionnaires submitted
by the INE, the response rate is usually large (around 90%). Firms that do
not undertake anyR&D activity during the period under study are excluded
from the analysis.5 After removing firms with missing values and firms that
did not report any positive internal R&D expenditure during the whole
period, we are left with an unbalanced panel of firms across a period of five
years, comprising 5045 observations.6
III (ii). Core Variables
Private R&D In the survey, firms are asked to report their total
expenditures in internal R&D activities.7 They also have to report the
percentage breakdown of the different sources of funds: internal funds;
other firms; public agencies; universities and non-profit institutions; EU
programs or foreign funds. Internal funds, corresponding to privately
financed internal R&D expenses, is the dependent variable in the empirical
analysis (Private R&D). Due to the skewness of the distribution, we use the
logarithm of one plus the level of this variable in our estimations.
Public Support The level of public support is defined as the total amount
of non-repayable public funds received by the firm, in order to finance
internal R&D activities. It does not include public loans since loans must be
reimbursed and are, therefore, classified as internal funds in the survey. Our
independent variable measuring public support (Public Support) consists,
therefore, of subsidies and public funds for R&D activities proceeding from
contracts between the firm and public agencies. Due to the skewness of the
distribution we use the logarithm of one plus the level of public support in
4We do not have the complete sample for the year 2001 so our panel includes the years 2000,
2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005.
5 The inclusion of these firms does not alter our main findings. See footnote 19 for more
details.
6We checked that the records removed formissing values were not different from the sample
we used finally. Specifically, for several observable dimensions, we could not reject the null
hypotheses of equal means for the firms included in the sample and those left out. As a further
robustness check, an earlier version of the paper used only a cross-section from the year 2002
(and lagged independent variables from the year 2000) to run our regressions. This sample
included 1,265 firms and delivered qualitatively similar findings.
7 Precisely, this is defined as ‘creative tasks developed inside the firm in a systematic waywith
the purpose of increasing the know-how to create new or improved applications as products
(goods or services) or processes (including research in software).’
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our estimations.8 Given that subsidies and contracts are two different policy
mechanisms, and exploiting the fact that the survey provides disaggregated
information about the relative amount of subsidies and contracts for the
years 2003 and 2005, we use that information to test the robustness of our
results by focusing only on those sectors for which contracts are hardly used
(see section V on extensions).9
Appropriability Only for the year 2000, the survey has a section with
seven questions where firms are asked about the effectiveness of different
appropriability mechanisms that are classified in two groups: ‘written
methods’ (patents, models/designs, trademarks and copyrights) and
‘strategic methods’ (trade secret, design complexity and lead time). The
answers are displayed on a Likert scale from 1 (important) to 4
(unimportant). These two kinds of appropriability mechanisms are known
in the literature as legal and strategic appropriability mechanisms (see, for
instance, Cassiman and Veugelers [2002]). We use the 2000 survey data to
build a firm-level measure of appropriability (Appropriability); that is the
sum of the scores for the four questions regarding legal protection
mechanisms (patents, models/designs, trademarks and copyrights) and
rescale it such that it varies between 0 (minimum level) and 1 (maximum
level).
Concerning our measure of appropriability it is worthwhile to discuss the
following issues. First, since we only have data on appropriability for the
year 2000, our measure has no time variation. We therefore assume that
appropriability depends essentially on characteristics that are constant over
time, or at least during the period under analysis. Second, we restrict our
measure to those questions related to legal appropriability mechanisms
because we want to explore the interaction between public support and the
effectiveness of IPR, which are policy mechanisms. Moreover, legal
appropriability in Spain is unlikely to have varied substantially over the
period under scrutiny. However, results (see section V(i) on extensions) do
not change qualitatively, when we include questions related to strategic
methods, in our measure of appropriability. Finally, some comments
concerning the use of a firm level measure of appropriability. Cockburn and
Griliches [1988] explore the ability of different appropriability measures,
based on subjective assessments from the Yale Survey data (Levin et al.
[1987]), to explain inter-industry differences. They find that measures based
on all appropriability mechanisms (strategic and legal) were less effective as
proxies for industry appropriability regimes than those based exclusively on
8 In an earlier version of the paper, we have estimated our regressions in levels obtaining
qualitatively similar results.
9David et al. [2000] discuss the potential differences between both kinds of R&D policies
when trying to measure the net effect on privately financed R&D expenses.
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legal mechanisms. Remarkably, they also find, as we do, more variation in
legal appropriability at an intra-industry level rather than across industry
averages. This large intra-industry variation could be due to differences in
managers’ opinions when responding to the survey as well as to perceived
differences in the potential use that the same appropriability mechanism has
for different firms. Although using managers’ perceptions introduces some
subjectivity in our measure of appropriability, those perceptions are key in
driving firms’ R&D decisions. Thus, some measurement error notwith-
standing, a firm-level measure of appropriability captures firm-level
variations within sectors, and has more explanatory power than industry
averages (Cassiman and Veugelers [2002]).
Given that the purpose of this paper is to capture the moderating role of
appropriability on the relationship between public support for R&D
activities and privately financed internal R&D expenses, we introduce an
interaction term between our measures of public support and appropria-
bility in all estimated specifications.
III (iii). Control Variables
We include several variables to control for other sources of heterogeneity
across firms, with respect to their R&D decisions.
Financial constraints are expected to affect the level of privately financed
R&D expenditures because firms facing financial constraints have a higher
marginal cost of capital (Hall [2002], Hyytinen and Toivanen [2005]). In
most studies, financial constraints have been proxied by firm size.
Fortunately, the Spanish CIS survey allows us to build a quite precise
measure of financial constraints. In fact, except for the year 2002, firms are
asked to rate the importance of three financial factors that limit their ability
to undertakeR&Dactivities.10 In order to obtain a firm-level measure of the
strength of financial constraints for every year we add the scores of the three
questions and rescale the total such that it varies between 0 and 1, where 0
indicates that financial constraints are unimportant while 1 stands for the
highest degree of importance. We define such a variable as Financial
Constraints. For the year 2002, we assign the average level of the computed
index for the years 2000 and 2003.11
Previous evidence suggests that public support is less effective for less
financially constrained firms. For instance, Hyytinen and Toivanen [2005]
demonstrate that government funding disproportionately helps firms from
industries that are more dependent on external finance. It is, therefore, very
10The three factors that firms are asked to rate as potential impediments to innovation are: a)
excessive economic risks; b) high innovation costs; c) lack of suitable external finance for
innovation activity. Scores go from 1 (very important) to 4 (unimportant). Results do not
change qualitatively if we use the answers to c) only.
11Results are not qualitatively affected if we simply exclude the year 2002 from the analysis.
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important in our study to control both for the direct and the moderating
effect of financial constraints in order to avoid spurious correlations
between our main variable of interest (i.e., the interaction between our
measures of public support and appropriability) and privately financed
internal R&D expenses. So, we also include, as an additional control, the
interaction between our measures of public support and financial
constraints.
We control for firm size by using as a proxy the total number of employees
(Size), and we enter it in logarithm in our estimations. Firm size may be
correlated with R&D effort because larger firmsmay obtain greater benefits
fromeconomies of scale and scope (Cohen [1995]). In addition, firm size is an
alternative proxy for, and inversely related to, the existence of financial
constraints.
We expect a firm’s ability to undertake R&D activities to be associated
with the level of R&D effort. First, to control for ‘unobserved innovation
ability,’ we include in most of our estimations, firm fixed effects. Second, we
also include the share of exports over total sales (Exports Intensity) and the
proportion of highly skilled employees (Skilled Employment) to control for
changes, over time, for such unobserved innovation ability.
Finally all specifications include year dummies; sector dummies with the
two-digit CNAE code (a Spanish equivalent of the SIC classification for
U.S. industries) and geographical dummies by Spanish province.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
IV (i). Descriptive Evidence
Table I shows descriptive statistics for the variables described above across
different categories of firms. The group of firms that received public support
for R&D activities is clearly different from the group of non-supported
firms. The former category demonstrates significantly higher levels of
privately financed internal R&D expenses, proportion of skilled employees
and propensity to export. These results are consistent with previous findings
byGonza´lez et al. [2005] who report that the probability of obtaining public
support is positively correlatedwith variables reflecting research experience.
Interestingly, we find that firms receiving public support report higher levels
of appropriability and lower levels of financial constraints. This could
suggest that public grants are not being efficiently assigned to firms forwhich
the market failures associated with R&D activities are more severe. We do
not find significant size differences in our sample between supported and
non-supported firms. Turning to non-R&D performers, as expected, they
report lower levels of appropriability and higher financial constraints to
undertake innovation activities. They also report a lower average propensity
to export than R&D performers, while no significant differences in size.
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Figure I provides a first look at the relationship between public support
and privately financed internal R&D expenses, depending on the level of
appropriability.
Exhibits (a) and (b) suggest that the elasticity of privately financed internal
R&D expenses with respect to public support is positive and that there is a
High appropriability
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Figure 1
Public Support and Privately Financed Internal R&D Expenses
Note: These graphs plot the logarithm of one plus public support and the logarithm of one plus
privately financed internal R&D expenses for the observations with positive public support. The
line corresponds to the linear prediction of the univariate regression model for each sub-sample.
Exhibits (a) and (b) correspond to observations with appropriability higher and lower than the
sample median respectively.
Table I
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
R&D performers (N5 5045)
Non-R&D
performers
(N5 2073)
Supported firms
(N5 1019)
Non-supported
firms (N5 4026)
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Private R&D 1742 7495 581 3124 – –
Public Support 342 1311 – – – –
Appropriability 0.20 0.24 0.15 0.21 0.04 0.14
Financial Constraints 0.42 0.27 0.50 0.30 0.70 0.32
Size 482 1458 448 3489 436 670
Skilled Employment 0.07 0.13 0.02 0.05 – –
Exports Intensity 0.32 0.29 0.25 0.27 0.12 0.23
Note: R&Dperformers are firms that havemade someR&D investment in the period under analysis whileNon-
R&D performers are those firms that did not perform any positive internal R&D expenditure during the whole
period. Private R&D and Public Support are in thousands of euros. The unit of observation is firm/year. We
report the results of the t-test for the difference in means between supported and non-supported firms where
indicates po 0.01; indicates po 0.05 and indicates po 0.1.
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significant difference between firms according to the level of reported
appropriability. For firms reporting appropriability levels lower than the
sample median, the elasticity doubles that of those firms reporting higher
levels of appropriability. So according to this preliminary evidence there is a
positive correlation between public support and privately financed R&D
expenditures, which decreases with the level of firm appropriability.
However, as we discuss in detail below, one should be cautious about
interpreting this evidence as a causal link since theremay be omitted factors,
correlated with either public support and privately financed internal R&D
expenses, which generate these results. The rest of the empirical analysis is
devoted to exploiting the panel structure of the data in order to investigate
this issue.
IV (ii). Endogeneity of Public Support
Acentral issue in estimating the impact of public support policies forR&D is
how to deal with its potential endogeneity. The empirical evidence on R&D
support policies shows that supported and non-supported firms differ
significantly, thereby indicating that public support is not randomly
allocated across firms. The non-randomness of public support has two
potential sources: the self-selection of firms in the participation stage and the
selection criteria applied bypublic agencies to assign the support. Blanes and
Busom [2004] provide evidence of the existence of self-selection in the
participation stage for a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms. They find
that larger firms and those with previous experience in R&D activities are
more likely to participate in R&D subsidy programs. Concerning the
selection criteria, although theoretically public support should be targeted
to those firms that are more affected by the market failures associated with
R&D activities, in practice, public agencies have incentives to select firms
that are successful at innovating (‘pick up the winners’) in order to prove the
effectiveness of the program (Wallsten [2000]). Since the characteristics that
drive both types of selection are also likely to affect the firm’s R&D
investment decision, then public support may not be exogenous to privately
financed internal R&D expenditures. For instance, firms with greater
innovation ability might bemore likely to both apply for public support and
receive it, and at the same time might have greater incentives to invest in
R&D activities.
To reduce the possible spurious correlation between public support and
privately financed internal R&D expenditures, we include in all of our
specifications several firm level time-variant control variables. Most
importantly, we include firm fixed effects that may be effective to proxy
for firms’ innovation ability, particularly if one thinks that innovation
ability is constant over short time periods. However, even after including
multiple controls, there still may be unobservable time-variant variables
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correlated with public support in the error term, which introduce a bias in
the OLS estimation of the marginal effect of public support. Thus, we use
instrumental variables as a means to address the remaining endogeneity of
public support.
As Lichtenberg [1988] points out, an ideal instrument for the amount of
public support would be the amount of funds that are ‘potentially
awardable’ to the firm. We use the budget dedicated to R&D policies,
across geographical regions and sectors, as an instrument for public
grants.12 We expect this variable to be correlated with the amount of public
support for firms belonging to a given geographical region and sector, since
the higher the potential budget the higher the likelihood of getting a grant.
Also, since the budget is a policy decision, we expect it to be exogenous with
respect to unobserved variables affecting a firm’s R&D investment.13 In
other words, we assume that, after including several control variables, the
public budget for R&D support policies in a given sector/region is an
exogenous source of variation of firmpublic support.Hence, the variation in
this instrument results from the availability of public support and not from
the access to it, thus obviating the selection problem that makes public
support potentially endogenous. Given the lack of information about the
public budget forR&Dpolicies, we use the total amount for public grants by
geographical region and sector, received by all firms included in the CIS
survey, as a proxy for the true budget (Public Support_IV). Recall that the
entire population of firms that receive some sort of public support is
surveyed every year. Moreover, given the high response rate in the Spanish
CIS survey (90%) and the fact that, typically, the entire available public
budget is distributed, the difference between our proxy and the real variable
is likely to be very small.14
Since all specifications include two interaction terms involving public
support, one with appropriability and the other with financial constraints,
we instrument these two interaction terms with the product of our
instrument for public support and each of the corresponding variables
(appropriability and financial constraints) respectively (see Wooldridge
[2002], pp.122 for a similar approach).
12Regions correspond to Comunidades Auto´nomas and sectors with the two digit CNAE
codes.
13Hyytinen and Toivanen [2005] report that when controlling for (not) having received a
subsidy, the availability of public funding (their key variable) still has a positive and significant
effect on firms’ R&D investment. The potential economic explanation is that firms in regions
with relatively higher availability of public funding are more likely to invest in R&D with the
expectation of receiving a subsidy. We perform a similar estimation (results available upon
request) and we do not find such an ‘anticipation effect’ in our dataset.
14 The mean value of this instrumental variable (Public support_IV) is 1064, being the
minimum value 0 and the maximum one 9,650 (units in thousand of euros).
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Summing up, our basic estimation strategy consists of using a fixed effects
transformation and then applying pooled 2SLS, where the instruments for
the three endogenous variables are time demeaned (see [Wooldridge] 2002,
pp. 321, for amore detailed descriptionof this approach). Several robustness
checks, all confirming our main finding, are described and reported in
section V.
IV (iii). Results
Table II shows the basic results; column (1) corresponds to the OLS
estimateswithout fixed effects, column (2) incorporates firmfixed effects and
column (3) reports the instrumental variable estimation including firm fixed
effects and using the instruments described above. Some comments about
the specifications are necessary at this stage. First, as we take the logarithm
of both privately financed internal R&D expenses and public support, the
central coefficient of interest is interpreted as an elasticity. Second, control
variables are included with one period lag in order to attenuate potential
endogeneity.We thus need to drop the first period and we are left with 4,008
observations. Third, in addition to the control variables reported in the
table, all estimations include year, sector and geographical dummies.15
Fourth, given thatAppropriability has no time variation, we do not include it
in the specifications with firm fixed effects, since it cannot be identified. In
other words, the direct effect of appropriability is included in the firm fixed
effect. Finally, the reported standard errors are clustered by firm for all
specifications, so they are robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
We start by discussing column (3), which is the specification that tackles
all endogeneity issues and yields consistent coefficients, and next we
compare it with the OLS estimates (columns 1 and 2) in order to assess the
effectiveness of our strategy to address the endogeneity of public support.16
The key finding emerging from column (3) is that the elasticity of privately
financed internal R&D expenditures with respect to public support
decreases as the level of appropriabilty increases (coefficient  0.41,
significant at 1%).
There are a couple of plausible explanations for this finding. First, firms
with stronger appropriability are more likely to ask for public support
purely as awayof reducing the cost of projects thatwere profitable in the first
place without such support; whereas those firms that face appropriability
problems aremore likely to ask for public support in order tomake anR&D
project profitable. Second, the literature suggests that public support
15 Sector and geographical dummies are included in addition to firm fixed effects because
some firms (although very few) report changes in their sector classification or geographical
location during the period under analysis.
16We report all specifications with both interaction terms simultaneously, but coefficients
are not sensitive to their sequential inclusion.
748 LILIANA GELABERT, ANDREA FOSFURI, AND JOSEP A. TRIBO´
r 2009 The Authors. Journal compilationr 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial
Economics.
13
constitutes a positive signal about the quality of the R&D projects to be
undertaken by the firm. This leads to an easier and cheaper access to
additional funds (Lerner [1999]). This certification effect is likely to depend
on the degree of appropriability. Specifically, when appropriability is weak,
firms are less likely to disclose important information about their R&D
projects. In other words, the amount of information divulged, concerning
R&D plans, is limited if intellectual property cannot be protected
adequately. By contrast, when appropriability is more effective, firms can
release information to the market without risking misappropriation. Thus,
the endorsement perceived by the award of public support has a stronger
effect for firms with weak appropriability, compared with those with
effective protection mechanisms for their innovations.17
Concerning the other interaction term, we find that the elasticity of
privately financed internalR&Dexpenditureswith respect to public support
is also contingent on the importance of financial constraints.Consistentwith
previous empirical evidence (Hyytinen and Toivanen [2005]) the stimulus
effect of public support increases with the strength of the financial
constraints. As mentioned above, firms with a higher degree of appro-
priabilitymight have fewer problems in raising funds for theirR&Dactivity,
suggesting a negative correlation between the importance of financial
constraints and appropriability (the correlation is indeed negative and
significant in our sample, r5  0.12). This argument highlights the
importance of including the interaction between public support and
financial constraints as a control in order to avoid upward bias in the
estimation of the moderator effect of appropriability.18
Finally, regarding the other control variables, we find that firms facing
stronger financial constraints invest less private money in internal R&D.
Also, firmswith higher proportion of skilled employees and share of exports
over sales invest relatively more private money in internal R&D. This result
was expected since both variables are related to a firm’s innovation ability. It
however vanishes when we control for firm fixed effects. Finally, firm size is
17 In order to further explore this possible explanation of a ‘certification effect,’ we have
estimated a specification using an indicator variable (i.e., a dummy) for public support instead
of the logarithmof one plus the amount of public support received.Results (which are available
upon request) are qualitatively unchanged and highly significant. This reveals that,
independently of the size of the subsidy, firms with low appropriability invest more once
they receive a grant than those firms for which appropriability mechanisms are more effective.
This finding further confirms the higher value of the signaling of public grants for firms with
weak appropriability.We cannot estimate a specification that includes both the dummyand the
amount of public support becausewedonot have separate instruments, andbecause of the high
correlation between the two.
18 Since size may also proxy the importance of financial constraints, we also run a
specification in which we include a third interaction term between public support and firm size
as a robustness check. This interaction shows up tobe insignificant.Most importantly, all other
coefficients remain practically unchanged.Results are available from the authors upon request.
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positively associated with privately financed internal R&D expenses which
may be explained by economies of scale and scope inR&Dactivity for bigger
firms.
Concerning the validity of the instruments used, columns (3a), (3b) and
(3c) show the results from the first stage estimations of the specification in
column (3). There is one reduced form equation for each potentially
endogenous variable. The estimated coefficients confirm that each instru-
ment is partially correlated with the potentially endogenous variable, which
is a necessary condition for the validity of the selected instrument. Since we
have multiple endogenous regressors we report the partial R-squared
measure proposed by Shea [1997], which takes intercorrelations among
instruments into account in order to test for the sufficient relevance of the
instruments to explain the endogenous regressors. Results from the Shea
partial R-squared suggest that the instruments are relevant; however, the
instrument for the interaction with financial constraints appears to be
weaker than the other twobecause of its lower partialR-squared and the fact
that, although significant, its partial correlation is close to zero.
To assess the effectiveness of our empirical strategy to control for the
endogeneity of public support, let us compare estimates across specifica-
tions. As we discussed in the previous section, the endogeneity of public
support generates a bias in the estimated coefficient of public support, which
depends on the sources of the endogeneity. Usually, the empirical literature
on public support for R&Dactivities argues that the bias is positive, thereby
implying that the unobservables are positively correlatedwith both receiving
public support and investing private money in internal R&D activities.
Table II shows that, after incorporating firm fixed effects (i.e., moving from
column (1) to column (2)), the coefficients for Public Support and for its
interaction with Financial Constraints drop significantly, while the
coefficient for its interaction with Appropriability remains around the same
level. Overall, these changes imply that the elasticity of privately financed
internal R&D expenditures with respect to public support becomes lower.
As argued above, firm fixed effects are expected to control for a firm’s ability
to innovate and thus they attenuate the positive bias resulting from the self-
selection of the participation stage and from public agencies’ incentives to
‘pick up the winners’ when they award support.
Finally, we compare the coefficients of the specifications in columns (2)
and (3), namely, after we instrument for the endogenous variables as
explained above. Notice that while the direct effect of public support
remains almost unchanged, the coefficient of its interaction with Appro-
priability becomes more negative, thus contributing to a reduction in the
overall elasticity of privately financed internal R&D expenditures with
respect to public support. This goes in the direction highlighted in the related
literature. However the change in the coefficient for the interaction between
Public Support and Financial Constraints is positive. The increase in the
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estimated coefficient could reflect a problem of weak instruments because,
although the partial correlation between the instrument and the endogenous
variable is significant, its magnitude is very close to zero, as reported in
column (3c).
V. EXTENSIONS
We ran several other specifications to verify the robustness of the
significance of the interaction term between appropriability and public
support estimated in column (3) of Table II. Table III reports some of them
Table III
Robustness Checks (LinearModelwith IVandFE)
Independent Variables
Dependent Variable: Log(1þPrivate R&Dit)
2SLS/FE
(1) (2) (3)
Log(1þPublic supportit) 0.13 0.13 0.14
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Log(1þPublic
supportit)
Appropriabilityi
 0.42  0.41  0.37
(0.17) (0.15) (0.20)
Log(1þPublic
Supportit)
Financial
Constraintsit 1
0.40 0.41 0.43
(0.15) (0.15) (0.20)
Financial Constraintsit 1  0.93  0.94  1.03
(0.50) (0.50) (0.62)
Log(Sizeit 1) 0.45
 0.47 0.55
(0.25) (0.25) (0.33)
Skilled Employmentit 1  0.46  0.20  1.32
(1.27) (1.27) (2.84)
Export Intensityit 1 0.21 0.24 0.59
(0.54) (0.55) (0.87)
Log(1þExternal
R&Dit 1)
0.02 – –
(0.01)
Log(1þOther Fundsit 1) –  0.02 –
(0.03)
Constant  0.16  0.16  0.20
(0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Observations 4008 4008 2473
Adjusted R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.04
Note: All models are estimated by instrumental variables. Column (1) includes the log of one plus externalR&D
investments as an additional control; column (2) includes the log of one plus other sources of funds as an
additional control and column (3) restricts the estimation to those firms belonging to sectors where public
contracts are hardly used. The instrument for public support is explained in section IV (ii) and both interactions
with public support are instrumentedwith the interaction between the instrument for public support and each of
the corresponding variables (Appropriability and Financial Constraints). All specifications include year, sector,
geographical dummies and firm fixed effects. Firm fixed effects are included in addition to sector and
geographical dummies because some firms (although very few) report changes in its sector classification or
geographical location during the period under analysis. Appropriability is not included as an additional control
because since it does not have variation over time its effect is included in the firm fixed effect. Standard errors, in
parentheses, are clustered by firm and so robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
indicates po 0.01,
indicates po 0.05 and
indicates po 0.1.
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for the linear models with fixed effects, taking into account the endogeneity
of public support.
Previous studies have documented the existence of complementarity
between internal and external R&D activities (e.g., Cassiman and Veugelers
[2006]).Given this evidence, wemaybe concerned that changes in the level of
external R&D investments (External R&D) could affect the decision to
invest in internal R&D.We include, therefore, in column (1) of Table III, the
logarithm of one plus the level of external R&D expenditures, with one
period lag, as an additional control. This variable is significant and has a
positive sign suggesting the presence of some complementarity between
internal and external R&D.However, this does not affect our central result.
Another concern is related to other possible sources of support for
internal R&Dactivities. The analysis is aimed atmeasuring the potential for
public support to stimulate firms to spend additional private funds on
internal R&D activities. We consider public support as composed of funds
provided by Spanish public agencies. However, there are other sources of
non repayable funds for internal R&D, like: universities, non-profit
institutions, EU programs or foreign funds (Other Funds). Changes in the
availability of these other sources of funds could systematically affect a
firm’s decision on privately financed internal R&D expenditures. In order to
take into account this possible source of variation, we introduce as a control
variable, with a single period lag, the logarithm of one plus the sum of these
other sources of funds. Results are presented in column (2) of Table III. This
new control is not significant and does not change the key findings.
We also ensure that our results are unaffected by our measure of public
support, which includes both subsidies and contracts. In order to do so, we
use disaggregated information about public support, provided by the
surveys for the years 2003 and 2005 to find the industries where contracts are
more frequent. Using this information, we compute the average level of
public contracts, within each sector, and exclude those firms belonging to
sectors reporting a use of contracts higher than the average level. This is the
case for the following sectors: Chemical (CNAE 24), Machinery and
Medical Equipment (CNAE 29), Electronic Material (CNAE 32), Other
Transport Equipment (CNAE 35), Research and Development (CNAE 73)
andLeisure,Culture andSports (CNAE92).According to our dataset, these
sectors account for almost 90% of the public contracts in 2003 and 2005.
After dropping these sectors, we loose 1535 observations. Column (3) of
Table III shows the results of the re-estimation with this new sample. Again,
coefficients are very slightly affected and the key result of the analysis is
robust.
Although not reported here, we ensure that themain result is not driven by
the particular measure of appropriability. We tried other measures, taking
into account not only legal but also strategic mechanisms. As argued before,
a firm’sR&Ddecisionswill be influenced by its perception of the potential to
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appropriate the returns from innovations; this potential can stem from
either of the surveyed mechanisms (legal or strategic). So, we estimate our
regressionswith the following twoalternativemeasures: the highest score for
the seven questions regarding protection mechanisms; and the sum of the
seven scores. The results are qualitatively unchanged.
Another issue we explored is to what extent this negative interaction
between public support and appropriability is sustained or reverses over
time (estimation available upon request). In order to analyze this issue we
have estimated the specification in column (3) of Table II by adding one lag
of public support and one lag of each of the interaction terms (with
appropriability and financial constraints). The coefficients on the con-
temporaneous variables remain around the same level and highly significant
as in column (3) of Table II, the lagged public support is positive and
significant, while the lagged interaction term with appropriability is
negative, but only significant at 12%. These results suggest that there is
some persistence in the effect of public support, but that the differential
effect according to the level of appropriability is mostly contemporaneous.
Another possible concern is the potential bias resulting from having an
unbalanced panel. Wooldridge [2002] analyzes the conditions under which
fixed effect estimations are consistent with unbalanced panels. He finds that
sample bias is not a problem if the selection is uncorrelated with the
idiosyncratic error term of the estimated equation. In order to test this
assumption, we include a lead selection indicator in the specification and test
for its significance. In our panel, each firm appears in period t only if it had
appeared in period t 1. Then, for attriters our selection indicator switches
from zero to one in the period just before the attrition. The selection
indicator is not significant when included in the fixed effects model. So we
can rule out the existence of selection bias arising from the unbalanced
nature of our panel.
Finally, a more serious issue we need to deal with is the censored status of
the dependent variable. Although our sample contains firms that havemade
some positive R&D investment during the analyzed period, for around 20%
of the firm-year observations, the value for privately financed internal R&D
is zero. So we take this into account and estimate a Tobit model.
Unfortunately, when T (the number of periods) is small we cannot treat
firm unobserved heterogeneity as a parameter to estimate because of the
‘incidental parameters problem’ that produces inconsistent estimates in
nonlinear models, with fixed effects (as discussed in Neyman and Scott
[1948], Wooldridge [2002]). A recent work by Green [2004] shows that
although the estimation bias for the slope parameters in the case of Tobit
models is not severe, the estimation of the disturbance variance is downward
biased and would, therefore, be transmitted to the estimates of the marginal
effects. Therefore, rather than treating the unobserved effects as parameters
to be estimated, we follow Chamberlain [1984] to model the distribution of
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unobserved effects conditional on the time average of the exogenous
variables. This model allows the instrument to be systematically correlated
with time-constant omitted factors. In addition, we take into account the
potential endogeneity of public support using the same set of instruments
described before. In the Appendix, following Wooldridge [2002] and
Wooldridge andPapke [2007], we derive the finalmodel to be estimated after
taking into account endogeneity, time invariant unobserved heterogeneity
and the censored status of the dependent variable.
In essence, to address endogeneity the estimation follows two steps, and
includes the firm level average of all exogenous variables in all estimated
equations to model firm fixed effects as explained above (Chamberlain
[1984]). More precisely, in the first step we estimate three reduced form
equations (one for each of the three endogenous variables). These equations
include each corresponding instrument, the other exogenous variables and
the firm level average of all exogenous variables (including the exclusion
restrictions). In the second step, we estimate a pooled Tobit for privately
financed internal R&D expenditures on the three endogenous variables, the
exogenous control variables, the firm level average of all exogenous
variables and the residuals of the first step estimations. The coefficients of
the residuals provide a test for endogeneity conditional on having good
instruments.
Table IV summarizes the results of the Tobit model estimated by
instrumental variables and including firm fixed effects (column 1) and for its
corresponding first stage estimations (columns 1a–1c). Table V reports the
marginal effects of the variables of interest evaluated at the mean of the
independent variables (column a), at the 5% and 95% percentiles of public
support and at themean of the other independent variables (columns b1 and
b2) and some descriptive statistics of the distribution of the marginal effects
across all sample observations (column c). The distribution of marginal
effects across all sample observations is skewed (left skewed for Public
Support and for its interaction with Financial Constraints, and right skewed
for its interaction with Appropriability). However, the mean, median and
mode are extremely close. In addition, the values for the 5% and 95%
percentiles show that for 90%of the observations, the estimated coefficients
are quite concentrated around the mean, so the marginal effects at the mean
seem to be a good representation of the marginal effects for the whole
sample. Interesting enough, the marginal effects at the mean are not very
different from the estimated elasticities of specification (3) of Table II,
further confirming the robustness of the findings.19
19 The results are also qualitatively unchanged if we use the unrestricted sample instead of
focusing on the analysis of the sample of firms that perform someR&Dduring the period under
analysis. In the unrestricted sample internal R&D expenses is uncensored for 3,203
observations and censored for the remaining 2,418.
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From the estimated elasticities, we can compute the derivative of privately
financed internal R&D expenses with respect to public support. Using the
average level of public support, appropriability and financial constraints for
the whole sample, the derivative is 1.25. If we divide the sample according to
the level of appropriability, then for those firms reporting appropriability
lower than the median, the derivative is around 1.75, while for those firms
reporting appropriability higher than the median it is around 0.60 (almost
three times smaller).Given that themaximum support provided generally to
private firms by the major support programs in Spain accounts for at most
50% of the project20, and that the dependent variable of this analysis
corresponds to internal funds invested in R&D (so it does not include the
public support), the derivatives we compute above evidence a strong
stimulus for the groupof firmswith the lowest levels of appropriability.With
regard to the group of firms with higher appropriability, the average
marginal effect reflects a much weaker stimulus. Moreover, we find that, at
the average values of all other independent variables, for firms with
appropriability higher than 0.65 (which are almost 7% of the supported
firms), we cannot rule out the existence of some crowding-out effect. This
evidence is however weak. In fact, a t-test on the hypothesis that the effect of
public support is not different from zero for the highest level of
appropriability, (i.e., 1), and evaluating financial constraints at the median,
does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis in all specifications. We can,
however, reject such null hypothesis for specification (3) of Table II when
financial constraints are set at the lowest value.21
Finally, concerning the validity of the instruments used, columns (1a) to (1c)
in Table IV show the results from the first stage estimations of the specification
in column (1). There is one reduced form equation for each potentially
endogenous variable. The estimated coefficients confirm that each instrument
is partially correlated with the potentially endogenous variable, which is a
necessary condition for the validity of the selected instrument. In addition,
given the reported F statistic, we reject that the sum of the reduced form
residuals equals zero justifying the use of instrumental variables.22
20 This is the case for programs from the Ministry of Science and Education (PROFIT
Program), Ministry of Transportation and Public Investments (through the Centre for
Experimentation for Public Investments-CEDEX), Ministry of Industry Tourism and
Commerce (CENIT and PROFIT Programs), Madrid Local Government (through the
IMADE and FEDER Programs) and the Ministry of the Environment, among others.
21However, given that the maximum support provided generally to private firms by the
major support programs in Spain accounts for at most 50%of the project, the fact that overall
privately financed R&D remains flat might imply that some crowding out occurs at non-
supported R&D projects.
22Notice thatwhen the sumof the reduced form residuals is different from zero, the standard
errors of the second stage are not asymptotically valid. Since this is the case in column (1) we
have re-estimated the model by MLE (which provides correct standard errors). Our central
coefficients remain statistically significant (see Wooldridge [2002], pp.532).
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V (i). AMatching Approach
As an additional robustness check, we use a matching approach to estimate
the counterfactual of the treated observations of our sample of performing
firms. We apply the bias corrected nearest-neighbour matching estimator
proposed by Abadie and Imbens [2006] and follow Gonza´lez and Pazo´
Table IV
Determinants of PrivatelyFinanced InternalR&DExpenses (TobitModel)
Independent Variables
Dependent Variable
Log (1þPrivate
R&Dit)
Log (1þ
Public
Supportit)
Log (1þPublic
Supportit) 
Appropriabilityi
Log (1þPublic
Supportit) 
Financial
Constraintsi
2SLS/TOBIT/FE First Stage Regressions of Specification (1)
(1) (1a) (1b) (1c)
Log(1þPublic Supportit) 0.18 – – –
(0.08)
Log(1þPublic
Supportit)
Appropriabilityi
 0.50 – – –
(0.27)
Log(1þPublic
Supportit)
Financial
Constraintsit 1
0.29 – – –
(0.08)
Log(1þPublic Support_IVit) – 0.40 0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.01) (0.02)
Log(1þPublic
Support_IVit)
Appropriabilityi
– 0.18 0.53 0.15
(0.11) (0.06) (0.06)
Log(1þPublic
Support_IVit)
Financial
Constraintsit 1
– 0.01 0.03 0.39
(0.06) (0.01) (0.03)
Appropriabilityi 3.70
  0.21  0.05  0.01
(0.60) (0.29) (0.12) (0.14)
Financial Constraintsit 1 0.21 0.12 0.03 0.16
(0.62) (0.34) (0.09) (0.22)
Log(Sizeit 1)  0.06  0.11  0.01  0.10
(0.42) (0.24) (0.07) (0.13)
Skilled Employmentit 1  8.11 0.72  0.36  0.60
(2.77) (1.70) (0.45) (1.04)
Export Intensityit 1  0.11  0.40  0.07  0.45
(1.00) (0.51) (0.14) (0.30)
LLog(Public Support_IV) 0.16
 0.08 0.02 0.04
(0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02)
LLog(Public
SupportAppropriability_IV)
0.02  0.03 0.01 0.08
(0.16) (0.14) (0.07) (0.07)
LLog(Public SupportFinancial
Constraints_IV)
 0.09  0.06  0.05 -
(0.65) (0.06) (0.02)
LFinancial Constraints  1.6  0.44 0.08  0.40
(0.77) (0.49) (0.13) (0.30)
LSize 0.96
 0.54 0.06 0.30
(0.43) (0.25) (0.08) (0.14)
LSkilled Employment 22.85
 7.29 1.57 4.61
(3.27) (2.56) (0.75) (1.59)
LExports Intensity 1.27 1.44
 0.32 0.84
(1.08) (0.62) (0.18) (0.36)
Constant 6.71  1.01  0.06  0.51
(5.53) (0.52) (0.16) (0.24)
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[2008] for its implementation in order to make our results comparable to
another study that uses Spanish data (although they employ a different
sample and a different time window). Notice that while in the specifications
TableV
MarginalEffects ofModel (1) inTable IVforCentralRegressors
Marginal
effects
Marginal
effects Marginal effects
(a) (b1) (b2) (c)
Mean Median Mode Sd. Sk.
5th
%
95th
%
Log(1þPublic
Supportit)
0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.015  2.58 0.14 0.18
Log(1þPublic
Supportit)

Appropriabilityi
 0.47  0.46  0.49  0.47  0.48  0.49 0.041 2.60  0.50  0.39
Log(1þPublic
Supportit)
Financial
Constraintsit 1
0.27 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.024  2.59 0.23 0.29
Note: marginal effects (a) correspond to the marginal effects evaluated at the mean values of the independent
variables.Marginal effects (b1) and (b2) correspond to themarginal effects evaluated at percentile 5%and 95%
of public support respectively and at the mean values of the other independent variables. Marginal effects (c)
report some descriptive statistics of the marginal effects across the sample.
TableV. (Contd.)
Independent Variables
Dependent Variable
Log (1þPrivate
R&Dit)
Log (1þ
Public
Supportit)
Log (1þPublic
Supportit) 
Appropriabilityi
Log (1þPublic
Supportit) 
Financial
Constraintsi
2SLS/TOBIT/FE First Stage Regressions of Specification (1)
(1) (1a) (1b) (1c)
F (p, q) 2.89 (1, 3894) – – –
Uncensored obs.
Censored obs.
3203
805
4008 4008 4008
Chi2 (DF) 1140 (113) – – –
Adjusted R-squared – 0.47 0.43 0.44
Note: the specification in column (1) is a Tobit model with firm fixed effects estimated by instrumental variables
as described in the text. The instrument for public support is explained in section IV (ii) and both interactions
with public support are instrumentedwith the interaction between the instrument for public support and each of
the corresponding variables (Appropriability and Financial Constraints). The terms ‘LVariable’ refer to the firm-
level mean of the corresponding variable. These terms are included in the specifications to model firm fixed
effects as explained in section V. The errors of the first stage estimations are included in specification of column
(1); we report the F statistic of testing the null hypothesis that the sum of the reduced form residuals equals zero.
Columns (1a)-(1c) correspond to the first stage estimations of specification in column (1). All specifications
include year, industry and geographical dummies. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by firm so
robust to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
indicates po 0.01,
indicates po 0.05 and
indicates po 0.1.
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estimated until now, the treatment is continuous (since it is the amount of
public support), the matching estimator we propose here tests the effect of a
binary treatment that indicates whether the firm received public support or
not. Nevertheless, if the results are consistent, it does constitute an
additional piece of support for the central hypothesis of this paper.
Critical to the application ofmatching estimators is the selection of the set
of characteristics that will determine the construction of the control sample.
The first variable used is the propensity score, which is the estimated
probability of receiving public support. In order to generate the propensity
score, we estimate a probit model where the dependent variable takes the
value one if the firm receives public support and zero otherwise. The
independent variables included in the estimation are the following: first, a
dummy variable reporting if the firm received public support in the previous
period to capture persistence in the assignment of public support; second,
firm level characteristics like size, export propensity, proportion of skilled
workers, appropriability and financial constraints (see section III (iii) for a
description of all these variables). Third, we include a dummy variable that
takes the value one if more than fifty percent of the firm is owned by foreign
capital (Foreign Ownership) to proxy the level of internationalization of the
firm, which may also influence the agency decision to award public support.
Finally, we include year, sector and geographical dummies.
The results of the estimated specification are presented in Table VI. The
percentage of correctly predicted outcomes denotes a reasonable goodness
TableVI
ProbabilityEquation for Public Support
Independent Variables Dependent Variable: Indicator of Public Support at time t
Indicator of Public Support at timet 1 0.42

(0.02)
Appropriabilityi 0.01
(0.03)
Financial Constraintsit 1  0.08
(0.02)
Log(Sizeit 1) 0.04

(0.01)
Skilled Employmentit–1 0.36

(0.13)
Exports Intensityit–1 0.10

(0.02)
Foreign Ownershipit 1  0.05
(0.01)
Observations 3537
Correctly predicted observations 0.85
Note: The reported coefficients correspond to the marginal effects of the probit model for the probability of
obtaining public support. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the firm received public support in year t
and zero otherwise. The estimated model includes year, sector and geographical dummies. The percentage of
correctly predicted observations is a weighted average of the percentage of correctly predicted zeros and ones
weighted by the fractions of zero and one outcomes. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and
indicates po 0.01,  indicates po 0.05 and  indicates po 0.1.
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of fit. The sign and significance of the estimated coefficients is consistentwith
previous empirical results for Spain (Gonza´lez and Pazo´ [2008], Gonza´lez
et al. [2005] and Busom [2000]), which indicate that there is significant
persistence in public support and that firms awarded public support for
R&D activities are typically bigger, have greater research experience, are
more internationalized, but are mostly financed by national capital.
Concerning appropriability, although the coefficient is not significant when
we include the lagged indicator variable for public support, it becomes
highly significant when we exclude this variable.
Using the estimated parameters of the probit model we obtain predictions
of the probability of getting public support for all sample firms (propensity
score) that we later use as one of the matching criteria. The other covariates
used to construct the control sample are the lagged level of privately financed
internal R&D expenditures to capture persistence in R&D activities, the
lagged public support dummy to capture persistence of public support and
finally size, sector and time dummies.23
Table VII provides the mean values of the subsamples of supported, non-
supported firms and the control group obtained after the matching, for the
whole sample and for the two subgroups with higher and lower level of
appropriability respectively (above and below the median value, respec-
tively).We report the tests comparing themeanof the treated firmswith each
of the other two groups. While supported and non-supported firms appear
very different before thematching, clearly the differences have been reduced
significantly after the matching.
Finally, Table VIII reports the estimated SATT (Sample Average
Treatment Effect on the Treated) on privately financed internal R&D
expenses for the whole sample of R&D performing firms and for the two
subgroups with higher and lower level of appropriability.We find that while
those firms with appropriability lower than the median invest significantly
more when they receive public support, the effect of receiving public support
is not significantly different from zero for firms with appropriability higher
than the median. These results are consistent with our contention that the
propensity to devote private expenses toR&Dafter receiving public support
is larger for firms that report low appropriability.
Overall, the results of the several robustness checks summarized in this
section support the view that the effect of public support on privately
financed internal R&D expenses is heterogeneous across firms, and that the
level of appropriability explains part of these differences.
23 Following Gonza´lez and Pazo´ [2008], we consider two size brackets (less and more than
200 workers) and aggregate manufacturing sectors in accordance with the standard industrial
aggregation of the SpanishNational Institute of Statistics (INE);we also aggregate services in a
single category.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper uses data from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) for the
period 2000–2005 carried out in Spain by the National Institute of Statistics
(INE) to investigate the interaction between public support for R&D
activities and appropriability. Taking into account the potential endogene-
ity of public support, firm unobserved heterogeneity, several other controls,
among which the strength of financial constraints, and after running a
variety of robustness tests, we find evidence of a significant negative
interaction between public support and appropriability. More precisely, the
estimated elasticities correspond to a derivative of 0.60 for firms reporting
higher levels of appropriability (i.e., above the median level), while the
derivative reaches 1.75 for those firms forwhich appropriabilitymechanisms
areweaker (i.e., below themedian level). Onaverage, the stimulation effect is
therefore three times larger for the half of the sample for which the
appropriability market failure is more severe. In addition to the support of
the existence of a negative moderating effect of appropriability, the
estimated coefficients also suggest the possibility of some extent of crowding
out among those firms reporting the highest levels of appropriability.
This paper makes therefore a contribution to the empirical literature on
public support for R&D activities by demonstrating that the effect of public
support is heterogeneous across firms, and that the level of appropriability is
crucial in explaining those differences. Too often the literature has treated
firms receiving public support as homogeneous, focusing mainly on the
estimation of the average affect of public support on the level of privately
financed R&D expenses. There are some exceptions: Hyytinen and
Toivanen [2005] have provided empirical evidence on the relevance of
financial constraints as a contingency factor in the effect of public support.
Gonza´lez and Pazo´ [2008], Gonza´lez et al. [2005], Lach [2002] investigate
firm size as a source of heterogeneity (firm size is expected to be negatively
related to the access to capitalmarkets). They show that small firms aremore
reactive to public support than bigger firms are.
This paper is not the first one using Spanish data to analyze the effect of
public support for R&D activities. A couple of recent papers (Gonza´lez and
TableVIII
AverageTreatmentEffect forThe SupportedFirms
All the sample High Appropriability Low Appropriability
Private R&D
53413
(75780)
38809
(82336)
197614
(97431)
Observations 3528 1508 2020
Treated Group 667 299 368
Control Group 1334 598 736
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroescedasticity. indicates po 0.01,
indicates po 0.05 and  indicates po 0.1
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Pazo´, [2008],Gonza´lez et al. [2005]) use a panel data from the Survey of Firm
Strategies (Encuesta de Estrategias Empresariales) between 1990 and 1999
to assess the effectiveness of public support.However, although these papers
discuss the role of firm size, their focus is more about measuring the average
effect of public support and the possible existence of crowding out. Instead,
we are more concerned about explaining the hetoregeneity across firms due
to the degree of appropriability. To this end, we exploit information
provided exclusively by the CIS survey on the effectiveness of appropria-
bility mechanisms and on the strength of financial constraints to build firm
level measures with the purpose of decomposing the average effect of public
support along these two dimensions. Despite the different focus of our
paper, and the fact that we use another database and time window, our
results are consistent with previous findings for Spanish firms. First, we find
that public support goesmainly to firmswith some level of R&D experience.
Second, our finding that financial constraints as well as the degree of
appropriability play a central role in explaining differences between firms is
in accordance to the finding that smaller firms are stimulatedmore by public
support. This is so because small firms are expected to face more financial
constraints andhave therefore less developedmechanisms for appropriating
the returns of theirR&Dactivity than large firms do. Finally, concerning the
magnitude of the average effect of public support on privately financed
R&D expenses, we find a stronger effect for our period of study.
Overall, ourfindings suggest thatwhenappropriability isweak, crowdingout
is much less likely than when protection mechanisms are strong and effective.
So, governmentagencies shouldbeparticularly carefulwhenallocating funds to
firms with strong appropriability. A related implication is that innovation
policies that are aimed at increasing appropriability, for instance by tightening
up IPR issues, cannot be treated separately from policies aimed at increasing
public support. Indeed, our findings show indirectly that ignoring this
interaction can give rise to an important misallocation of public money.
APPENDIX
TOBITMODEL FOR PANEL DATAWITH AN ENDOGENOUS REGRESSOR
In this technical appendix we describe how to estimate a Tobit model for panel data
with a large cross-sectional dimension and relatively few timeperiods allowing for time-
constant unobserved effects that can be correlated with the explanatory variables and
for the presence of an endogenous variable.
Assume we have the following model,
ð1Þ yit1 ¼ max ð0; zit1d1 þ a1yit2 þ ci1 þ uit1Þ
ð2Þ yit2 ¼ zitd2 þ ci2 þ uit2
ðuit1; uit2Þjzi; ci1; ci2  bivariate normal
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Where ci1 is a time invariant unobserved effect, zit5 (zit1. zit2) are exogenous variables
with one exclusion restriction and uit1 represent time varying omitted factors that can
be correlated with yit2. For simplicity we assume only one endogenous variable, but the
extension for more than one is straightforward provided there are sufficient
instruments.
Following Chamberlain [1984] we make the following assumptions to model the
heterogeneity:
ð3Þ ci1 ¼ c1 þ Ziz1 þ ai1
ð4Þ ci2 ¼ c2 þ Ziz2 þ ai2
with (ai1., ai2) independent of zi and where Zi ¼ T1
PT
t¼1 zit is the vector of time
averages for each exogenous variable (including those omitted from (1)). Plugging (3)
and (4) respectively into (1) and (2) we have
ð5Þ yit1 ¼ max ð0; zit1d1 þ a1yit2 þ c1 þ Ziz1 þ ai1 þ uit1Þ
ð6Þ yit2 ¼ c2 þ zitd2 þ Ziz2 þ ai2 þ uit2
and under joint normality,
vit1 ¼ r1vit2 þ eit1; eit1jðzi; vit2Þ  Normal ð0; s2e1Þ; t ¼ 1; . . . ;T :
Where vit15 ai1þ uit1 and vit25 ai2þ uit2 So finally we can write,
ð7Þ yit1 ¼ max ð0; c1 þ zit1d1 þ Ziz1 þ a1yit2 þ r1vit2 þ eit1Þ
Because eit1 is independent of (zi, vit2) it is also independent of yit2. Now yit2 is
contemporaneously exogenous in (7) but not necessarily strictly exogenous so we
proceed to estimate in the following two stages. First we estimate pooledOLS of yit2 on
1, zit, Zi and get the residuals v^it2. The next step is to estimate pooled Tobit of yit1 on 1,
zit1. Zi, yit2, v^it2 obtaining d^1, a^1, c^1, x^1, r^1 and d^
2
e1. Finally we computemarginal effects.
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